My research focuses on Philosophical Logic and Metaphysics. So far, I have mostly focused on the metaphysics and logic of modality. I've spent a lot of time thinking about the distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world and how it might help articulate and defend propositional contingentism. Recently, I've been thinking about ontological nihilism—the view that there are fundamentally no objects. I'm interested in how we might better defend this view with the use of higher-order languages and logic. I'm also interested in the metaphysics of properties/propositions.
Publications
1. "Two distinctions about world-relative truth". Analysis. Forthcoming
The distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world plays a significant role in many debates in modal metaphysics. In this note, I argue that there are two radically different ways of making the distinction precise. Moreover, I argue that the differences matter, showing how they differently constrain the modal metaphysics of properties and propositions.
2. "Contingentism and Fragile Worlds". Inquiry (Online First), 2024 | Link | Final Version
Propositional contingentism is the thesis that there might have been propositions which might have not have been something. Serious actualism is the thesis that it is impossible for a property to be exemplified without there being something which exemplifies it. Both are popular. Likewise, the dominant view in the metaphysics of modality is that possibility and necessity can be understood—in some sense—in terms of possible worlds, i.e., total ways the world could have been. Here, I argue that, given some minimal assumptions, the conjunction of propositional contingentism and serious actualism entails that worlds are modally fragile—every world is ontologically dependent on every proposition. I then show that such a consequence is inconsistent with the claim that propositions true at all possible worlds are necessary.
3. "What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?". Philosophical Studies 181: 1851–1875. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Brauer (2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer's argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer's argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer's argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer's argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer's argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound.
4. "Some ways the ways the world could have been can't be". Journal of Philosophical Logic 53: 997–1025. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism---the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist---and (iii) contingentism---the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem---a master argument---which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.
5. "Serious Actualism and Nonexistence". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(3): 658–674. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that serious actualism is false because of properties like the property of non-existence. I argue that such arguments are indeed successful. However, I also argue that we should distinguish a weaker formulation of serious actualism using the actualist distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. This weaker formulation is then shown to be consistent with the existence and possible exemplification of properties like the property of nonexistence. I end with a novel argument for the weaker formulation.
6. "Serious Actualism, Typography, and Incompossible Sentences". Erkenntnis (Online First) 2023 | Link | Final Version
I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I argue that the best resolution to it does not work: it fails to capture the right distinctions we ought to make between what I call typographical sentence types--a previously undiscussed class of fine-grained sentence types which are partially individuated by their typography, or how they look when written out.
7. "Propositional contingentism and possible worlds". Synthese 200 (5): 1-34. 2022 | Link | Final Version
Propositional contingentists make use of possible worlds frequently. However, a neglected question concerns whether there are any notions of worlds which are both theoretically adequate and consistent with propositional contingentism. Here, I argue that no adequate notion of a possible world is available to at least those who subscribe to one natural formulation of propositional contingentism. I also show that this result contrasts with a simple and adequate definition of a possible world available to the necessitist.
Publications
1. "Two distinctions about world-relative truth". Analysis. Forthcoming
The distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world plays a significant role in many debates in modal metaphysics. In this note, I argue that there are two radically different ways of making the distinction precise. Moreover, I argue that the differences matter, showing how they differently constrain the modal metaphysics of properties and propositions.
2. "Contingentism and Fragile Worlds". Inquiry (Online First), 2024 | Link | Final Version
Propositional contingentism is the thesis that there might have been propositions which might have not have been something. Serious actualism is the thesis that it is impossible for a property to be exemplified without there being something which exemplifies it. Both are popular. Likewise, the dominant view in the metaphysics of modality is that possibility and necessity can be understood—in some sense—in terms of possible worlds, i.e., total ways the world could have been. Here, I argue that, given some minimal assumptions, the conjunction of propositional contingentism and serious actualism entails that worlds are modally fragile—every world is ontologically dependent on every proposition. I then show that such a consequence is inconsistent with the claim that propositions true at all possible worlds are necessary.
3. "What does nihilism tell us about modal logic?". Philosophical Studies 181: 1851–1875. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Brauer (2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer's argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer's argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer's argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer's argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer's argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound.
4. "Some ways the ways the world could have been can't be". Journal of Philosophical Logic 53: 997–1025. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Let serious propositional contingentism (SPC) be the package of views which consists in (i) the thesis that propositions expressed by sentences featuring terms depend, for their existence, on the existence of the referents of those terms, (ii) serious actualism---the view that it is impossible for an object to exemplify a property and not exist---and (iii) contingentism---the view that it is at least possible that some thing might not have been something. SPC is popular and compelling. But what should we say about possible worlds, if we accept SPC? Here, I first show that a natural view of possible worlds, well-represented in the literature, in conjunction with SPC is inadequate. Though I note various alternative ways of thinking about possible worlds in response to the first problem, I then outline a second more general problem---a master argument---which generally shows that any account of possible worlds meeting very minimal requirements will be inconsistent with compelling claims about mere possibilia which the serious propositional contingentist should accept.
5. "Serious Actualism and Nonexistence". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(3): 658–674. (2024) | Link | Final Version
Fine (1985) and Pollock (1985) influentially argue that serious actualism is false because of properties like the property of non-existence. I argue that such arguments are indeed successful. However, I also argue that we should distinguish a weaker formulation of serious actualism using the actualist distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. This weaker formulation is then shown to be consistent with the existence and possible exemplification of properties like the property of nonexistence. I end with a novel argument for the weaker formulation.
6. "Serious Actualism, Typography, and Incompossible Sentences". Erkenntnis (Online First) 2023 | Link | Final Version
I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I argue that the best resolution to it does not work: it fails to capture the right distinctions we ought to make between what I call typographical sentence types--a previously undiscussed class of fine-grained sentence types which are partially individuated by their typography, or how they look when written out.
7. "Propositional contingentism and possible worlds". Synthese 200 (5): 1-34. 2022 | Link | Final Version
Propositional contingentists make use of possible worlds frequently. However, a neglected question concerns whether there are any notions of worlds which are both theoretically adequate and consistent with propositional contingentism. Here, I argue that no adequate notion of a possible world is available to at least those who subscribe to one natural formulation of propositional contingentism. I also show that this result contrasts with a simple and adequate definition of a possible world available to the necessitist.
