Conditionals, Part II: *Philosophical Logic*. Lectures Outline & Readings.

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1. Summary

Conditionals are widespread. "If you eat that cheese, you'll be very ill", "If it weren't for me, the vase would have broken", "We'll make the train if we start running now". Yet developing an adequate semantics for conditionals has proven difficult—some even think that a truth conditional semantics is impossible. In these lectures, we'll look at several of the most influential accounts of the semantics of conditionals.

Six lectures, one on each Tuesday in Weeks 1–6, 9am–10am, Room 9 in Sidgwick Site Lecture Block.

2. Lectures Outline & Readings

Ideally, you should do the reading before the lecture and familiarise yourself with the topic that week. Lectures will build on previous weeks and so familiarity with already covered material is ideal. Handouts will be posted online after the lecture.

Lecture I. *Introduction to Conditionals*. Tuesday, 10th October.

> Johnathan Bennett (2003), *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*, Chps. 1 & 4.

> Ernest Adams (1975), Subjunctive and Indicative Conditionals, *Foundations of language*, pp. 89—94.

(*Notes*. Chapter 1 of (Bennett, 2003) is a nice introduction to conditionals in general and Chapter 4 recaps some core ideas of probability theory and introduces 'The Equation'. (Adams, 1975) contains a nice discussion of the distinction between subjunctive and indicative conditionals. The Adams reading is a little hard to find online. Here's the jstor link: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25000429.)

Lecture II. *Triviality and Non-Propositional Accounts*, Tuesday 17th October.

> Dorothy Edgington (1995), On Conditionals, *Mind* Vol. 104. No. 414, §§5–7.

> Johnathan Bennett (2003), *A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals*, Chps. 5 & 7.

> David Lewis (1976), Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities, *The Phil. Review*, 85(3), pp. 297–315

(*Notes*. Focus on (Edgington, 1995) and (Bennett, 2003) and read Lewis's original triviality result in (Lewis, 1976) if you have time. Note that the Edgington paper is *long*—this week, focus on only §§5–7 which contain a nice overview of various triviality results and a nice discussion of the idea that conditionals don't have truth conditions. Similarly with (Bennett, 2003).)

Lecture III. *Stalnakerian Semantics for Indicatives.*

> Robert Stalnaker (1975), Indicative Conditionals, *Philosophia* 5, 269–286

> Robert Stalnaker (1968), 'A Theory of Conditionals' in *Studies in Logical Theory*, (ed.) Nicholas Rescher, 98–112.

(*Notes*. Focus on (Stalnaker, 1975) which is a nice introduction to Stalnaker's framework, including a nice discussion on reasonable inference and contexts of assertion. The (Stalnaker, 1968) is very useful, and discusses the formal semantics, and the features of conditionals on that semantics, in more detail, but doesn't clearly distinguish subjunctive conditionals from indicative conditionals.)

Lecture IV. *Introduction to Subjunctive Conditionals: Goodman and Lewis*

> Dorothy Edgington (1995), On Conditionals, *Mind* Vol. 104. No. 414, §1 and §3.

> David Lewis (1973), *Counterfactuals*, Chp. 1.

Lecture V. *More of Lewis on Counterfactuals*

David Lewis (1973), *Counterfactuals*, Chp. 4, §2.

David Lewis (1979), Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow, *Noûs* 13(4), 455–476.

(*Notes.* Look at (Lewis, 1973) for an early discussion of similarity. (Lewis, 1979) develops his more sophisticated view of similarity.)

Lecture V. *Against Possible Worlds Accounts of Counterfactuals*

Dorothy Edgington (2004), 'Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight' in *Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World* (ed.) Dowe and Noordhof, 12–27

Kit Fine (2012), Counterfactuals Without Possible Worlds, *The Journal of Philosophy* 109(3), 221–246