Personal Identity, Part IA: Metaphysics. Lecture Outline & Readings.

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1. Summary

We change all the time. But which changes lead to your non-existence and which lead to your continued existence? What makes you the same person over time? In these lectures, we'll look at several of the most influential answers to these questions. Is your continued existence a matter of mere psychological continuity? mere physical continuity? or something like biological or animal continuity? some further fact? does it matter?

Six lectures, one on each Thursday in Weeks 1-6, 3pm-4pm, Room 3 in Sidgwick Site Lecture Block.

2. Lecture Outlines & Reading List

Ideally, you should do the reading before the lecture and familiarise yourself with the topic that week. Lectures will build on previous weeks and so familiarity with already covered material is ideal. Handouts will be posted online after the lecture.

Lecture I. Introduction to Personal Identity. October 5th.

Amy Kind (2015), 'The Nature of Persons' in *Key Concepts in Philosophy: Persons and Personal Identity*. Eric Olson (2003), 'Personal Identity' in *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind*, §§15.1–15.2

Lecture II. Psychological Approaches: Memory, Basic Problems, and Continuity. October 12th.

Amy Kind (2015), 'The Psychological Approach to Personal Identity' in *Persons and Personal Identity*. John Locke (1689), *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chp. 27.

Lecture III. Psychological Approaches: Reduplication Problems, October 19th.

Eric Olson (2003), 'Personal Identity' in *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind*, §15.5 Harold Noonan (2019), 'Chp. 7: The Reduplication Problem' in *Personal Identity*.

Lecture IV. Physical Approaches: Turning the Tide, October 26th.

Lecture V. Physical Approaches: Animalism, November 2nd.

Eric Olson (2002), An Argument for Animalism, in *Personal Identity* (eds.) Martin and Barresi, 318–348 Eric Olson (2003), 'Personal Identity' in *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind*, §§15.6–15.7

Lecture VI. Further Facts or Nothing Really Matters? November 9th.

Derek Parfit (1971), Personal Identity, *The Philosophical Review* 80(1), 3–27

Brian Garret (1998), Parfit and 'What Matters' in *Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness*.

Amy Kind (2015), 'From Reidentification to Characterization' in *Persons and Personal Identity*, §3.3 & §5.1.